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INTRODUCTION
When the author last addressed himself to the problems of
documentation under the Uniform Commercial Code's Article 9,1
it was his belief that he had sufficiently covered the field for all
practical purposes. However, as the next few years passed, the
volume of cases actually increased. More distressing is the fact that
the later cases often indicate multiple basic misunderstandings by
lenders and counsel of the Code's requirements. Considering that
perhaps a majority of today's practicing lawyers studied the Code
in law school, one would have expected the general level of
proficiency to have increased. This has not proved to be the case.
The goal of Article 9, "to provide a simple and unified structure
within which the immense variety of present-day secured financing
transactions can go forward with less cost and with greater
security," ' 2 does not appear to have been realized. The surface
simplicity of the creation of security interests under the Code has
often yielded to underlying problems. As noted by the Second
Circuit, "despite this simplification and clarification of the law, the
answers to relatively straightforward questions remain clouded by
uncertainty.
",

*Member Rhode Island Bar and partner in Strauss, Factor, Chernick & Hillman. P.C.; J.D.,
Boston University, 1957.
1. Hillman, Article 9 Documentation. Pathways and Pitlals, 81 COMm. L.J. 468 (1976).
2. U.C.C. 5 9-101, Official Comment,
3. In reKnapp. 575 F.2d 341.342 (2d Cir. 1978).
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This article varies from its predecessor in a number of
respects. First, it assumes less basic knowledge, offering at least a
refresher course in several areas. Second, it has grown in scope as
the variety of experience under the Code has increased. Last, it
adopts a somewhat more transactional approach, for easier
reference.
THE BASICS IN BRIEF
To obtain the blessed state of UCC perfection, which generally
assures protection against third party claims, 4 there must first be a
security agreement, "an agreement which creates or provides for a
security interest.'' 5 A security interest is "an interest in personal
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an
obligation. ,,6 Once a security interest has been granted, and has
attached (which requires agreement plus value given plus debtor's
rights in the collateral'), the final step is generally filing of the
security agreement, or a short-form financing statement, in the
public records. 8
The nature and content of these documents is examined in the
following sections.
THE DOCUMENTS
Creating a security interest under the Uniform Commercial
Code usually 9 requires a security agreement. To satisfy the Code's
Statute of Frauds, the agreement must be in writing, be signed by
the debtor, and contain a description of the collateral. 1 0 To obtain
perfection - protection against the claims of third parties to the
collateral' - the security agreement itself may be placed in the
public record, if signed by the secured party, 1 2 or the parties may
execute and file a short-form financing statement, which gives their
4. See U.C.C. § 9-301 (references to sections ofArticle 9 which have been altered or renumbered
by the 1972 revision arc cited as 1972 U.C.C.).
5. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(h), 1972 U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(1). See Barth Bros. v. Billings, 68 Wis.2d 80,
227 N.W.2d 673 (1975).

6. U.C.C,

1-201(37).

7. U.C.C. § 9-204(1), 1972 U.C.C. § 9-203(1). Concerning attachment, see In re Cotinty Green
Ltd. Part., 438 F. Supp. 693 (W.D. Va. 1977), and cases cited.
8. For instances of perfection without filing, see U.C.C. §§ 9-302 through 9-306.
9. No security agreement is required if the collateral is in the possession of the secured party, the
classic pledge, U.C.C. § 9-203(1 )(a), or for the limited exceptions for instruments as collateral.
10. U.C.C. § 9-203(1). See Tate v. Gallagher, 116 N.H. 165, 355 A.2d 417 (1976), and cases
cited.
11. See U.C.C. § 9-301.
12. The requirement of the secured party's signature is eliminated by 1972 U.C.C. § 9-402(l).
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names and addresses and describes the nature of the collateral. 13
The similarity in content of the two documents has led to
considerable confusion, generally resolving itself into a basic
question: Can a financing statement also be a security agreement?
In a case of first impression,' 4 the Rhode Island Supreme
Court responded in the negative:
[W]hile it is possible for a financing statement and a
security agreement to be one and the same document...,
it is not possible for a financing statement which does not
contain the debtor's grant of a security interest to serve as a
security agreement ....
The financing statement does not
interest. 15
security
a
of itself create
The decision was attacked by commentators as a horrible
anachronism, "reminiscent of the worst formal requisites holdings
tinder the nineteenth century chattel mortgage acts."1 16 One court
characterized the case as requiring "technical words of
17
conveyance" to create a security interest.
The controversy continued, with the Tenth Circuit requiring a
specific grant of the security interest, 18 and the First Circuit voicing
concern about the "continuing tension" in cases regarding the
necessity for a formal security agreement. 19 Nevertheless, the
smoke appears to have settled and certain basic principles have now
emerged.
Most courts appear to accept the premise that "[n]o magic
words or precise form are necessary to create or provide for a
security interest so long as the minimum formal requirements of
the Code are met," 20 and that there is no necessity for "a separate
document entitled 'security agreement' as a prerequisite for
enforcement of an otherwise valid security interest. "21 On the other
13. U.C.C. § 9-402(1).
14. American Card Co. v. H.M.H. Co.. 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963). See also Mid-Eastern
Electronics Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank. 380 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1967): General Electric Credit Corp. v.
Bankers Commercial Corp.. 244 Ark. 984. 429 S.W.2d 60 (1968).
15. 97 R.I. at 62. 196 A.2d at 152 (emphasis added).
16. 1 G. GItL.MORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 348 (1965).
17. Evans v. Everett, 279 N.C. 352. 183 S.E.2d 109(1971).
18. Mitchell v. Sheperd Mall State Bank, 458 F.2d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 1972).
19. In re Numneric Corp.. 485 F.2d 1328, 1331 (1st Cir. 1973).
20. In r Amex-Protein Dev. Corp., 504 F.2d 1056, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Shelton
Erwin. 472 F.2d 1118 (8th Cir. 1973): In re Sportsland, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. 1333 (D. Mass. 1975):
In re Nottingham, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1197 (E.D. Tenn. 1969). Cases cited in U.C.C. Rep. are generally
decisions olbankroptcy judges not otherwise reported.
21. Little v. County of Orange. 31 N.C. App. 495. 229 S. E.2d 823, 824 (1976). Se, also In re,
33
Ntumeric Corp.. 485 F.2d 1328. 1
1 (1st Cir. 1973): In re Carmichael Ent.. 334 F. Stipp. 94 (N.D.

Ga. 1971). aff'd. 460 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1972).
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hand, "[a] considerable body of case law has developed to the effect
that a standard-form financing statement, taken alone, cannot also
be considered a 'security agreement' that satisfies 9-203(1)
(b).... "22
The statute says that the security agreement must create or
provide for a security interest. 23 The courts differ on how far the
documentation must go to satisfy this test. One court has stated
that the requirement "may be satisfied not only when a security interest is caused to be or brought into existence, but also when
provision or stipulation is made therefor," 24 and held adequate as a
security agreement a note containing the provision "[t]his note is
secured by a security interest in [specified goods]." However, a
recital that "this note is covered by security agreement dated
" in the absence of the referenced document,2 5 or
that certain collateral has been deposited with the lender, 26 or that
the note represents "loan for 1965 Ford ' 27 have been held insufficient elsewhere. The courts seem to be seeking "language ...
in the instrument which when read and construed leads to the
logical conclusion that it was the intention of the parties that a
security interest be created," ' 28 but the logical constructions differ
from court tocourt.
An intent, seemingly a present intent, to grant a security
interest has been held insufficient if not accompanied by something
to create the intended result. 29 There is a split of authority on the
question of whether a security agreement, signed in blank by the
debtor and later completed by the creditor with debtor's consent is
a sufficient grant of a security interest, 3 ° but, of course, it would be
22. In re Numeric Corp., 485 F.2d at 1331. See ala, In re Mann, 318 F. Stipp. 32 (W.). Va.
1970); Gibbs v. King, 263 Ark. 338, 564 S.W.2d 515 (1978); Komas v. SBA, 139 Cal. Rptr. 661)
(Cal. App. 1977); 1, & V Co. v. Asch, 267 Md. 251, 297 A.2d 285 (1972); Crete State Bank v.
Laithoff Grain Co., 195 Neb. 605, 239 N.W.2d 789 (1976); In re Mancini Meat & Prov. Co., 23
U.C.C. Rep. 1037 (D. Conn. 1977); In re Shoreline Eluc. Suipp. Co., 18 U.C.C. Rep. 231 (1). Conn.
1975); In re Sportsland, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. 1333 (D. Mass. 1975); In re Rand, 6 U.C.C. Rep.
1129 (D. Me. 1969); In re Pennar Paper Co., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1964). Similarly,
notation ofa lien on a motor vehicle certificate of title is instifficient to create a security interest in the
ahsenceofa security agreement. In reCorsi, 24 U.C.C. Rep. 216 (D. Vt. 1978), and cases cited.
23. U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(h); 1972 U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (I).
24. In re Amex-Protein Dev. Corp., 504 F.2d at 1058. See also In re Penn Housing Corp., 13
U.C.C. Rep. 947 (W.D. Pa. 1973); In reCenter Auto Parts, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 398 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
25. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales v. Hurst, 176 N.W.2(1 166 (Iowa 1970).
26. Safe Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Berman, 393 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1968); In re Vielleuix, 5
U.C.C. Rep. 277 (D. Conn. 1967). Butcf Kruse, Kruse & Miklosko v. Beedy, 353 N.E.2d 514 (Ind.
App. 1976) (escrow arrangement).
27. In re Rand, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1129 (D. Me. 1969).
28. In re Nottingham, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1197, 1199 (E.D., Tenn. 1969).
29. In re Taylor Mobile Homes, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. 565, 569 (E.D. Mich. 1975); In re
Martronics, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 364 (D. Conn. 1964).
30. Invalid: In re Hein, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 745, 749 (W.D. Wis. 1976). Valid: Means v. United
Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 302, 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). One commentator argues that
these cases are distinguishable. 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1177, Editor's Note.

ARTICLE

9

DOCUMENTATION

insufficient if never completed. 31 There must be "evidence of an
agreement, ' ' 32 . perhaps even the derided "words of creation or
grant. ',33

A standard pre-Code form of trust receipt has been held a
sufficient security agreement, 34 at least as to collateral specifically
36
described. 35 Where a lease is held to be one intended as security
and, accordingly, subject to the rules of Article 9,37 slightly
38
different concepts may apply.
It should be noted that the security agreement need not be a
single document. The Code defines "agreement" as "the bargain
of the parties in fact" 39 and the courts have generally not been
reluctant to examine an entire "bundle of papers" 40 to determine
41
the sufficiency or existence of a claimed security agreement.
Notwithstanding the salvage value of the foregoing cases, one
should not knowingly ignore the plea of one federal judge: "Banks
and lending institutions would be well advised to use a single form
of security agreement, and thereby avoid burdening referees and
courts with this type of unnecessary problem." 4 Unfortunately, no
one has yet been able to design a satisfactory universal form.
REQUIRED (IF DESIRED) PROVISIONS
While great latitude is permitted in the content of the security
agreement, there are some rights which a secured party can obtain
only if the security agreement so provides. These include the right
31. Union Nat'l Bankv. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1163 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
32. Scott v. Stocker, 380 F.2d 123, 127 (10th Cir. 1967).
33. First County Bank v. Canna, 124 N.J. Stiper. 154, 305 A.2d 442, 444 (App. Div. 1973). See
also DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969); Needle v. Lasco Ind., 10 Cal. App. 3d 1105,
89 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1970); In re Shoreline Elec. Stpp. Co., 18 U.C.C. Rep. 231 (D. Conn. 1975).
34. In re United Thrift Stores, 363 F.2d 11, 13 (3d Cir. 1966).
35. In re Mann, 318 F. Supp. 32, 36(W.D. Va. 1970).
36. U.C.C. %1-201(37).
37. U.C.C. 9-102.
38. In re Walter W. Willis, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. Ohio 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 995 (6th
Cir. 1971).
39. U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
40. In re Matronics, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 364, 368 (D. Conn. 1964). See also In re Modern Engineering
&Tool Co., 25 U.C.C. Rep. 580 (D. Conn. 1978).
41. Young v. Golden State Bank, 560 P.2d 855 (Colo. App. 1977); In re Miller, 545 F.2d 916
(5th Cir. 1977), Cert Den 430 U.S. 987 (1977); In re Amex-Protein Dev. Corp., 504 F.2d 1056 (9th
Cir. 1974); In re Wambach, 343 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Il1. 1972), aff'd, 484 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1973);
Nunnemaker Trans. Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 456 F.2d 28, 31 (9th Cir. 1972); In re Fibre Glass
Boat Corp., 324 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D. Fla.), qff'd, 448 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1971); Komas v. SBA, 139
Cal. Rptr. 669 (Cal. App. 1977); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Salerno, 168 Conn. 152, 362 A.2d 904
(1975); Casco Bank & Trust Co. v. Cloutier, 398 A.2d 1224 (Me. 1979); In re Bazaar de ]a Clisine
Int'l, Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1049 (S.D.N.Y 1976) (applying N.J. law); In re Truckers Int'l, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 1337 (W.D. Wash. 1975). Contra, In re Shoreline Elec. Stipp. Co., 18 U.C.C. Rep. 231
(D. Conn. 1975). Casco Bank & Trust Co. v. Cloutier, supra, indicates that the standards may be
more stringent if this theory is sought to be applied against third party claimants.
42. In re Wambach, 343 F. Supp. 73, 76 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
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to notify account debtors prior to default, 43 the right to charge back
uncollected collateral in "factoring" arrangements, 4 4 the right to
require the debtor to assemble the collateral, 45 and the right to
attorneys' fees. 46 Where rights and duties are provided in the
Code, the security agreement may "determine the standards by
which the fulfillment of those rights and duties is to be measured if
such standards are not manifestly unreasonable." ' 47 The most
common applications of this last provision are to detail the nature
and direction of required notices and foreclosure or repossession
techniques.

FUTURE ADVANCES
One of the great improvements of the UCC over common law
and earlier statutory devices was its recognition of open-ended
financing arrangements. The Code is specific that the "obligations
covered by a security agreement may include future advances...
whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to
commitment. "48 Difficulty has arisen because of the Official
Comment of the draftsmen that "under [this provision] collateral
may secure future as well as present advances when the security
agreement so provides. . . .[T]his
subsection validates the future
advance interest, provided only that the obligation be covered by the security
agreement. ',49
The Comment, which may not be a required reading of the
text of the statute, has led some courts to conclude that "in order
for a security agreement to subject the collateral to future advances,
the security agreement must clearly indicate that the obligation
covered includes future advances. "° Another reading of some of
these cases is that even the inclusion of a future advance clause will
43. U.C.C. §9-502(l).
44. U.C.C.§ 9-502(2).
45. U.C.C. § 9-503. See Clark Equip. Co. v. Armstrong Equip. Co., 431 F.2d 54 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied402 US 909 (1971).
46. U.C.C. § § 9-504(l)(a); 9-506.
47. U.C.C. §9-501(3).
48. U.C.C. § 9-204(5); 1972 U.C.C. § 9-204(3).
49. U.C.C. §9-204 (1962) Official Comment 8 (emphasis added).
50. Texas Kenworth Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 564 P.2d 222 (Okla. 1977). See also In re Sanelco, 7
U.C.C. Rep. 65 (M.D. Fla. 1969); In re Rivet, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 1087 (E.D. Mich. 1967); Coin-omatic Service Co. v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. 1112 (R.I. Sup. 1966). The
Review Committee considered these cases so clearly erroneous that it declined to revise Article 9 to
overrule them. Review Committee for Article 9 ofthe Uniform Commercial Code, Permanent EditorialBoard.for
the Uniform Commerical Code, Final Report 226 (1971). Contra, Provident Finance Co. v. Beneficial
Finance Co., 36 N.C. App. 401, 245 S.E.2d 510 (1978), where the court's position is described as
"the majority view" despite citation only of commentators in favor of its holding.
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be insufficient if the subsequent advance differed in type from the
nature of the original obligation of the debtor; for example, a
security agreement originally covering a fixed term loan could be
insufficient to cover a subsequent inventory revolving loan. Such
arguments should be rejected. 51
These cases appear to arise most frequently in "re-writes" of
what would have been conditional sales contracts under pre-UCC
law. The debtor, having financed his original purchase of the
collateral, needs additional funds. The secured party makes an
additional loan, but relies upon his original security agreement
(usually an installment sales contract), even though it does not
contain an explicit future advance clause. It appears to be fairly
clear that this is an extremely dangerous practice which should be
avoided if possible. (The problems of including a future advance
provision in an installment sales contract while complying with
consumer protection and disclosure laws are beyond the scope of
this text.)
AFTER-ACQUIRED COLLATERAL
After-acquired property presents a situation similar to that
involved in future advance clauses, although the decisions have
been a bit more liberal. Revised Article 9 Section 9-402(1)52 states
that "a security agreement may provide that any or all obligations
covered by the security agreement are to be secured by after
acquired collateral. ',53
Some cases have indicated that lack of "after-acquired
language" in the security agreement will not bar the inclusion of
the additional collateral, at least where trade custom, or normal
business practice, indicates that a floating mass of collateral was
intended. 54 However, this is not a universal rule. In re Paine55
involved a security agreement which covered "inventory and
accounts receivable," but which, in the bankruptcy judge's
51. SeeKimball Foods, Inc v. Repoblie Nat'l Bank. 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'd sub nor.
United Statesv. Kimball Foods, Inc.. __
U.S. __.
99 S.Ct. 1448 (1979). Chrysler Credit Corp.
v. Community Banking Co., 24 U.C.C. Rep. 223 (Conn.Sup. 1978). In Thorp Sales Corp. v.
Dolise Bros. Co., 453 F. Supp. 196 (WD. Okla. 1978), the argument was rejected, but the future
advance clause held not to encompass obligations of debtor assigned to the secured party by others.
See a o In re E.A. Fretz Co., 565 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1978), and text at note 126 infra.
52. The prior UCC language, section 9-204(3), stated "a security agreement may provide that
collateral, whenever acquired, shall secture all obligations covered b the securit;s
agreement." The
change in language was merely "for clarity.'" 1972 U.C.C. § 9-204, Reasons for Change.
53. In consumer goods transactions, the after-acptoired property provision ends in ten days.
U.C.C. § 9-204(4) (b);1972 U.C.C. § 9-204(2).
54. Get It Kwik of America, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank. 24 U.C.C. Rep. 944 (Ala. Cis. App.
1978): Frankel v. Associates Financial Services Co., Inc., 22 U.C.C. Rep. 801 (Md. App. 1977),
and cases cited; Whitworth v.Krueger, 98 Idaho 65. 558 P.2d 1026 (1976).
55. 15 C.B.C. 621 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
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language, did "not contain any language which could be
interpreted as an after-acquired property clause." 56 The court held
that only inventory and receivables existing at the date of execution
were covered by the security agreement.
The reach of the after-acquired property clause is sometimes
quite extensive. In American Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v. 0. & E.,
Inc., 5 7 a junior lienor took possession of a retail store, admittedly
subject to a senior security interest. He then transferred the assets
to a new corporation, which continued to operate, acquiring new
inventory and selling the old in the normal course. It was held that
the senior security interest extended to inventory purchased by the
new corporation. 5 8
CONTENTS OF THE FINANCING STATEMENT
The statutory provisions governing the contents of the
financing statement are set forth in 1972 UCC Section 9-402:
(1) A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names
of the debtor and the secured party, is signed by the
debtor, 59 gives an address of the secured party from which
information concerning the security interest may be
obtained, gives a mailing address of the debtor and
contains a statement indicating the types, or describing
the items, of collateral

....

When the financing statement

covers crops growing or to be grown, the statement must
also contain a description of the real estate concerned....
A copy of the security agreement is sufficient as a
financing statement if it contains the above information
and is signed by the debtor.
(8) A financing statement substantially complying with
the requirements of this section is effective even though it
contains minor errors which are not seriously misleading.
56. InrePaine, 15 C.B.C. 621, 623 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
57. 23 U.C.C. Rep. 1034 (Colo. App. 1978). See also Boulder Bank & Trust Co. v. United
States, 26 U.C.C. Rep. 774 (D. Okla. 1979), and cases cited.
58. American Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v. 0. & E., Inc., 23 U.C.C. Rep. 1034, (Colo. App.
1978). See also In re Taylorville Eisner Agency, Inc., 445 F. Spp. 665 (S.D. Ill. 1977) (1972 Code);Walter E. Heller & Co., Inc. v. Salerno, 168 Conn. 152, 362 A.2d 904 (1975); Inter Mountain Ass'n
ofCredit Men v. Villager, Inc., 527 P.2d 664 (Utah 1974).
59. The opening language in the earlier version of Article 9 is: "A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and the secured party, gives an address ....
U.C.C. § 9-402(l)
(1963).
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Fixture filings are subject to additional requirements. 60
The plain language of the statute, with the allowance for error
contained in Subsection (8), would appear to have created a
relatively fool-proof mechanism. This has not proved to be the
case. As one judge has noted, "[i]t is most improbable that its
sponsors anticipated the extent to which secured credit under the.
Code would be jeopardized by the errors and omissions of secured
parties in satisfying the simple requirements of a sufficient financing statement. "61
The following sections will review the individual elements in
some detail, indicating, where appropriate, the areas in which the
contents of a security agreement and financing statement may, or
should, differ.

DEBTOR'S NAME
Both the security agreement and the financing statement
should contain the debtor's name correctly stated and spelled. This
is particularly important in the case of the financing statement,
which must be indexed "according to the name of the debtor" by
the filing officer. 62 Normally, the debtor will be the principal
obligor on the underlying indebtedness; the "person who owes
payment or other performance of the obligation secured. "63 But
"[w]here the debtor and the owner of the collateral are not the
same person, the term 'debtor' means the owner of the collateral," ' 64 and it is the owner's name which should appear on the
financing statement.

65

Counsel should be particularly aware of this problem where
the debtor is a group of related companies or where a "family car"
is involved. In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Washington Trust
60. U.C.C. 5 9-402(1); (1972)U.C.C. § 9-402 (8).
61. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc. v.Tabenken, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 565, 575(D. Me. 1970).
62. U.CC. § 9-403(4).
63. U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(d).
64. Id. SeeWhite Star Distrib., Inc. v. Kennedy, 411 N.Y.S.2d 751 (App. Div. 1978).
65. K.N.C. Wholesale, Inc. v. AWMCO, Inc., 127 Cal. Rptr. 208 (Cal. App. 1976), vacated,
128 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Cal. App. 1976); In re Smith-Whitehead, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. 589 (S.D. Fla.
1975); Bank of'Gering v. Glover. 192 Neb. 575, 223 N.W.2d 56 (1974); General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Terra Contractors Corp.. 6 U.C.C. Rep. 544 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969); In re Men's Action
Shop, Inc.. 27 R.I.B..j. (No. 2) 18 (D.R.I. 1978).
The owner of the "borrowed collateral" is entitled to certain notices and rights under U.C.C.
9-112. Where the collateral is household goods, both husband and wife may be the owners.
Provident Finance Co. v. Beneficial Finance Co.. 36 N.C. App. 401, 245 S.E.2d 510 (1978). Not
onlv the owner's name but his signature is requtired. Souithwest Bank v. Moritz, 203 Neb. 45, 277
N.W.2d 430 (1979).
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Rosemary and her husband, David, decided to purchase a
new car. The dealer prepared an invoice in Rosemary's name. The
down payment was delivered by David, who signed a security
agreement and financing statement in his own name. However, the
car was registered to Rosemary. While affirming the trial court's
finding that David had some rights in the vehicle, the appellate
court held that the security interest was unperfected, since
Rosemary was the owner of the collateral and her name did not
appear on the financing statement. 67
The semi-standardized form of financing statement adopted in
most states, commonly called a "UCC-1," has labeled boxes in
which the required information is placed. The debtor's name and
address go in Box 1, at the upper left; the name and address of the
secured party in Box 2, top center. If the debtor's name is placed in
Box 2, and the secured party's in Box 1, with the printed captions
remaining unchanged, the filing is defective. 68 The printed caption
for Box 1 usually provides that the debtor be listed "last name
first." Reversing the order has been held to be a fatal defect, as the
filing officer may not properly index such a statement." 9 One would
hope that, if the statement is in fact properly indexed, a reasonable
court would sustain its validity.
Co.,

TRADE NAMES
Where the debtor does business Linder a trade name, or is
known by an assumed name, extreme care must be taken in
preparing the financing statement. Under the 1972 revision of
Article 9, Section 9-402 is amended to provide that "[a] financing
statement sufficiently shows the name of the debtor if it gives the
individual, partnership, or corporate name of the debtor, whether
or not it adds other trade names or the names of partners. "70 In the
comments to this provision, the draftsmen note that the
revision
contemplates filing only in the individual name, not in a
trade name. In the case of partnerships it contemplates
66.
R I.
,386A.2d 1096(1978).
R.I . ..
.. 386
67. General Motors Aceptance Corp. v. Washington Trnsl Co.. A.2d 1096, (1978). See a/io In re Magrey, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 868, 870 (1).Conn. 1979): In re Bossom,
432 F.Sotpp. 1013 (D. Conn. 1977); Provident Finance Co, v. Beneficial Finance Co., 36 N.C. App,
401, 245 S.E.2d 510(1978).
68. In reUptown Variety, 6 U.C.C. Rep.221 (D. Ore. 1969).
69 In reBrawn, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1031 (D. Me. 1969). Contra, In reGraham, 18 U.C.C. Rep.
1318 (W.D.Mich. 1975).
70. 1972 U.C.C. §9-402(7).
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filing in the partnership name, not in the names of any of
the partners, and not in any other trade names. Trade
names are deemed to be too uncertain and too likely not
to be known to the secured party or person searching the
71
record, to form the basis for a filing system.
The author suggests that, in the case of a partnership, the opposite
may well be true, namely, that trade names or the names of the
partners are more likely to be known than the name of the
partnership and that the same uncertainty may prevail as to the
actual partnership name. A distinction based upon whether or not
mama is a partner in the mama-papa grocery store is basically
unsound.
Revised Section 9-403(5) does, however, permit indexing
under several names of a single financing statement, which should
assist those who are aware of the problem, and which may be
marginally less expensive than the current conservative practice of
filing multiple financing statements.
The following cases deal with decisions under the earlier
version of Section 9-402, which does not contain the language
quoted above. Notwithstanding the amendment and the Official
Comment, they may well retain some vitality. Although there is
some support under the older statute for the validity of a filing
2
against a debtor in his trade name, especially in the earlier cases,7
and despite a Ninth Circuit dictum that "[f]iling under an assumed
trade name is effective unless it is misleading, ' ' 73 the clear trend of
the later decisions is to invalidate such interests, 74 and, as noted
above, the revision of the statute requires use of the actual name of
the individual or corporate debtor.
One court formulated a "general rule,"
that a financing statement, in order to perfect a security
interest, must, in the case of an individual, or individuals,
71. Id.,
Official Comment 7.
72. In re Platt, 257 F.Stipp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966); In re Bengtson, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 283 (D. Conn.
1965); In re Hatfield Const. Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. 907 (M.D. Ga. 1971); In re Uptown Variety, 6
U.C.C. Rep. 221 (D. Ore. 1969).
73. Sil;eg v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 509 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 1975). See also In re
Hammons, 438 F. Stpp. 1143 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
74. In re Leichter, 471 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1972), and cases cited; In re Firth, 363 F.
Supp. 369 (M.D. Ga. 1973): In re Hill, 363 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Miss. 1973), In re
James Wells Enterprises, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 900 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Citizens Bank v.
Anslev, 476 F. Supp. 51 (M.D. Ga. 1979) (incorrect trade name); In re Webster, 20
U.C.C. Rep. 802 (W.D. Mich. 1976). In re Pasco Sales Co.-, 383 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App.
Div. 1976). Counsel for creditors in In re Farm
& Home Supply Co., 22 U.C.C. Rep.
1081 (W.D. Pa. 1977) were unsuccessful in claiming that a filing was defective because
it failed to list a trade name in addition to the actual name.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

doing business under a trade name show the name of the
individual legally responsible for the debt unless the trade
name and the individual debtor's name are so similar that
a prospective creditor, upon seeing the trade name in the
records, would be alerted that there might be a prior
security interest in the involved collateral. 75 In one case
involving a properly registered trade style, the
bankruptcy judge stated: "[T]he filing of a financing
statement in which an individual debtor is designated under an assumed business name is not calculated to give
notice to the present or future creditors of such individual....

",76

Another decision found the secured par-

ty conceding that a trade name filing is invalid against the
trustee of an individual, but claiming that the filing is
valid when the debtor is a partnership. The bankruptcy judge
agreed.77

In another interesting case, a partnership was formally
organized as "Farm Wood Company" but operated under the
trade name "Farm House Market." The financing statement,
signed by the partners, gave both the official and trade names of the
partnership and it was indexed under both. The court stated the
following:
[T]he plaintiff contends, and this court agrees, that the
insertion on the financing statement of only the
partnership name and the name it used in its business,
and the indexing under either of those names in the [filing
office] was satisfactory compliance with statutory
requirements.
If this were a case where the financing statement was
signed with the trade name of the debtor and the secured
party filed and indexed the statement only under the
trade name and not the debtors' name, then the financing
statement would be insufficient to perfect the security
interest. .

organized

.

. However, here the debtor was a formally

and named partnership

which also used

75. In re Fowler, 407 F.Skipp. 799, 803 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
76. In re Levins, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 1076, 1082 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Coca-Cola Bottling
Plants. Inc. v. Tabenken, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 565 (D. Me. 1970); In re Jones, II U.C.C. Rep. 249
(W.D. Mich. 1972); In reEichler, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 1400 (E.D. Wis. 1971), aff'd, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 1406
(ED. Wisc. 1971).
77. In re Hlimphrey, 12 U.C.C.Rep. 986 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
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another name in its business operations, both names
appeared on the financing statement and the statement
was indexed tinder both of those names.
[I]f a financing statement is signed in the name of the
partnership which is the debtor kinder the security
agreement, then there has been compliance with [9402(1)1.78
What, one may ask, would be the result if there had been no formal
partnership agreement? This decision is a distorted mirror image of
an earlier case in which the filing was in the individual names of the
partners, rather than the registered trade style of the partnership. A
junior lienor claimed that a proper filing could only be made in the
79
trade name. The argument was rejected.
California did require the "trade name or style," if used, on
the financing statement. Failure to supply the correct trade name
was fatal. 80 The statute in that state now requires inclusion of the
trade name "if known to the secured party, but a failure to include
such trade name shall not under any circumstances affect the
validity of the financing statement." 8 1
In re Metzler82 presents another facet of the trade name
problem. The debtor operated two distinct businesses under
different trade names, one a furniture manufacturing plant and the
other a retail furniture store. Debtor granted a security interest to
creditor, a supplier to the manufacturing operation. The security
agreement named the debtor "d/b/a [manufacturer]," and, in
addition to a catch-all clause, 8 3 had appended a list of items of
collateral, all of which were used in the manufacturing plant. The
security agreement made no reference to the debtor's retail
business. However, financing statements were filed against debtor
using both trade names as well as his natural name. The creditor
sought to reclaim the assets of the retail store. Considering parol
evidence as to the intended scope of the security interest, the court
determined that the catch-all did not cover the retail operation's
assets.
78. In re Lockwood, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 195, 203 (D. Conn. 1974). See also In re Katz, 563 F.2d 766
(5th Cir. 1977); Board ofComm'rs v. Berkeley Village, 580 P.2d 1251 (Colo.App. 1978).
79. Thompson v. O.M. Scott Credit Corp., 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 85 (1962). See also In re Holmes, 9
U.C.C. Rep. 1160 (W.D. Mich. 1971); Dotiglas-Guardian Warehoise Corp. v. Esslair Endsley
Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. 176 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
80. In re Thrift Shoe Co., 502 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1974).
81. CAL. COM. Coi) § 9402(1)(West. 1978).
82. 405 F. Supp. 622 (N.D. Ala. 1975).
83. See text at note 161, infra, for similar language.
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ERRORS AND MISNOMERS
The UCC draftsmen appreciated that errors would be made in
preparing financing statements and provided that a "financing
statement substantially complying. . . is effective even though it
contains minor errors which are not seriously misleading. ", 84 But
what is a minor error? What mistakes are not seriously misleading?
The problem is most acute in the area of names, now Linder
discussion, since, as noted, the filing officer indexes the financing
85
statement in the debtor's name.
In the first significant decision, the district court held that the
misnomer "Excel Department Stores" for the correct name "Excel
Stores, Inc.," was seriously misleading. The court stated that, in
today's complex business world, where multiple subsidiary
corporations are commonly utilized, the rules of construction must
have reasonable limitations: "Too loose rules invite confusion,
encourage fraud, and undermine faith and stability in security
transactions."18 6 On appeal, the decision was reversed. The
87
misnomer, said the Second Circuit, was a minor error.
One bankruptcy judge's holding that describing "Raymond
F. Sargent, Inc. as "Raymond F. Sargent Co., Inc.," was fatally
defective, 88 has been described by the district court in his jurisdiction as a "fanatical and impossible reading" of the statute. 89 The
overwhelming weight of authority is that an error in spelling the
last name of an individual debtor is fatal. Kaplas for Kaplan, 90
93
Boyald for Borgwald, 9 1 Ranelli for Ranalli, 92 and Brown for Brawn
84. U.C.C. 9-402(5); 1972 U.C.C. §9-402(8).
85. U.C.C.
9-403(4). He may also have some form of cross-reference indexing. The Ninth
Circ,, it has isad the sopplerenial index to save an otherwise patently defective filing. In re Green
Mill Inn, 174 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1973). Of co,,rse, a complete misnomer of the corporation, withoot
extcmating circnistances, is fatal. Nat'l Cash Ragister Co. v. Mishkin's 125th St. Inc., 8 U.C.C.
Rep. 411 (N.Y. Sop. Ct. 1970).
86. In re Excel Stores, Inc., I U.C.C. Rep. 616,620 (D. Conn. 1963).
87. In re Excel Stores, Inc.. 341 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1965). See also In re Cauiser's Town & Countrv
S,,per Market, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 541 (N.D. Ohio 1965); General Motors Acceptance Corp. V.
Terra Constractors Corp., 6 U.C.C. Rep. 544 (N.Y. Cir. Ct. 1969) holding that "Inc." for
"Corp," was a minor error Sales Finance Corp. v. McDermott, 240 Mass. 493. 165 N.E.2d 119
(1960).
88. In re Ravmond F. Sargent, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. 583 (D. Me. 1970).
89. In re Recto Elec. Co., 19 U.C.C. Rep. 947, 951 (D. Me. 1976). See also In re Soothern
Sopply Co., 405 F. Sopp. 20 (E.D.N.C. 1975); In reA & T Kwick-N-Handi, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep.
765 (M.D. Ga. 1973); In re Nara Non Food Distrib. Inc., 66 Misc.2d 779, 322 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sop.
Ct. 1970), qff'd without op., 36 App. Div. 796, 320 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1971); In re Gibson's Discount
Pharmacy, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 233 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
90. BankofNorth Americav. Bank ofNotley, 94 N.J. Soiper. 220, 227 A.2d 535 (1967).
91. Nat'l Cash RegisterCo. v. Walley Nat'l Bank, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
92.John Deere Co. v. William C. Pahl Const. Co., 59 N.Y. Misc.2d 872, 300 N.Y.S.2d 701
(Sip. Ct, 1969), aff'd, 34 App. Div. 2d 85, 310 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1970).
93. LnreBrawn, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1031 (D. Me. 1969).
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were all held to be seriously misleading. "Shelia" for "Sheila" as a
first name has been held to be a minor error where the last name
was correct. 94 It has been held that when "James Lee Anderson"
uses "Lee Anderson" in obtaining credit, lenders accepting the
truncated name do so at their peril. 95 Nonetheless, where the
debtor used a variant spelling of his actual name for all purposes,
filing under the technically incorrect spelling has been upheld. 96 An
"alias" case must be determined on its own facts. Naming the
debtor correctly will suffice, even if an incorrect trade name is
added. 91
One bankruptcy judge seems to take a much more liberal view
of these problems. He contends that if the signature of the debtor is
legible, the filing should be considered valid, even though the
debtor's name is typed incorrectly in the body of the financing
statement. 98 His decisions, however, have not been generally
accepted. 99
CHANGE OF NAME
The 1972 revision of Section 9-402 adds a new provision:
Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an
organization its name, identity or corporate structure that
a filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading,
the filing is not effective to perfect a security interest in
the collateral acquired by the debtor more than four
months after the change, unless a new appropriate
financing statement is filed before the expiration of that
time. A filed financing statement remains effective with
respect to collateral transferred by the debtor even though
the secured party knows or consents to the transfer. 0 0
The official comments indicate that the new requirement
94. Benelicial Finance Co. v. Korland Cadillac-Oldsmobile Inc., 57 Misc. 2d 806. 293
N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sop. Ct. 1968). rev'd, 32 App. Div.2d 643, 300 N.Y.S.2d 884 (App. Div. 1969),
vWithOilt re c
tt+letto this pont
95. Central Nat'l Bank v. Co niinniit Bank. 528 P.2d 7 iO(Okla. 1974). See also In re Arnold, 21
U.C.C. Rep. 1479 (W.D. Mich. 1977). Contrawise. it'a debtor grants a security interest ising his
correct naeic. t l iling is valid against a clain that he was tiversally regarded as having another
liist nane. United States v. Smith. 22 UC.C. Rep. 502 (N.D. MIiss. 1977).
96. In re Gtstaison, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 231 (W.D. Okla. 1973).
97. Drvsdale \. Cornerstone Bank, 562 S.W.2d 182 (Mo. App. 1978).
98. In T Vaighan. 4 U.CC. Rep. 61 (W.D. Mich. 1967): In re Kolesza. 4 U.C.C. Rep. 66
(XV.D. Mich. 1967). Seealsi In w Levins. 7 U.C.C. Rep. 1076 (E.D.N.Y. 19701).
99. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants. Inc. v. Tabenken. 7 U.C.C. Rep. 565 (D. Me. 1970).
100. 1972 U.C.C. 9-4027).
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provides some guidelines when mergers or other changes
of corporate structure of the debtor occur with the result
that a filed financing statement might become seriously
misleading. . . . [T]he principle sought to be achieved...
is that after a change which would be seriously
misleading, the old financing statement is not effective as
to the new collateral acquired more than four months
after the change, unless a new appropriate financing
statement is filed before the expiration of the four months.
The old financing statement, if legally still valid tinder the
circumstances, would continue to protect collateral
acquired within the four months. Obviously, the
subsection does not undertake to state whether the old
security agreement continues to operate between the
secured party and the party surviving the corporate
change of the debtor. 101
Perhaps the first case to consider the revised provision was In
re Taylorville Eisner Agency, Inc. 102 Almost simultaneously with the
granting of an inventory loan to the individual debtors, the assets of
the business were transferred to the now-bankrupt corporation,
which assumed the security interest. The trustee alleged that the
lender's security interest was unperfected as to assets acquired
more than four months after the "change of name," and the
bankruptcy judge agreed.
On appeal, the district court reversed, indicating that the two
sentences of 9-402(7) quoted above impose different tests:
Where such a change [a change of name, corporate
structure, etc.] occurs the secured party must determine
whether the filed financing statement has become
seriously misleading. If so, the filing is not effective to
perfect a security interest in the collateral acquired by the
debtor more than four months after the change unless a
new appropriate financing statement is filed before the
expiration of that time. There is no knowledge
requirement in the sentence. . . The burden. . . is upon
the secured party.
The.
101.

.

final sentence deals with a different problem,

1972 U.C.C. § 9-402(7), Official Comment 7.
102. 445 F.Stipp. 665 (S.D. I1. 1977).
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namely where the debtor transfers the secured collateral ....

Prior to this provision it was debated as to whether

the security interest would continue in the collateral even
after it entered the possession of the transferee, whether
any after-acquired property of the transferee could be
included under the original debtor's security interest, and
whether a new filing was necessary. . . . The final
sentence of this amendment. . . settles the question by

saying that a new financing statement must be filed.
• . . In the present case the transferee corporation clearly
knew.

.

.

that the collateral,

including after-acquired

inventory and merchandise, was subject to a perfected
security interest. The.

.

. [final] sentence.

.

. is clear that

the filed statement remains effective with respect to
collateral transferred by the debtor regardless of the
knowledge or consent of the secured party. This also
means collateral which is after-acquired property.
In the instant case had any creditors checked the
corporation's source of title they could have easily
discovered

the assumption of the notes.

.

.

and by

running a check on those names found the filed financing
statements....
• . .First National Bank did not have to file a new
financing statement within four months after the transfer
in order to retain its perfected security interest in afteracquired property. 103
While this reading of the statute has at least superficial appeal, to
the extend that it is based upon availability of asset source histories
to potential creditors, it is misleading. The trade creditor, unlike an
institutional lender, does not normally have access to the corporate
and pre-corporate history of his customer.
In general, under the prior version of the statute, when a
corporation changed its name, 10 4 or a proprietorship or partnership
changed its trade name, 10 5 no refiling was necessary to continue the
103. In re Taylorville Eisner Agency, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 665, 668-70 (S.D. Ill. 1977).
104. Continental Oil Co. v. Citizens Trust & Savings Bank, 397 Mich. 203, 244 N.W.2d 243
(1976); In re Pasco Sales Co., 77 N.Y.Misc. 2d 724, 354 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. Ct. 1974); In re Grape
Arbor, Inc., 6 U.C.C. Rep. 632 (E.D.Pa. 1969). Seealso Siljegv. Nat'l Bank ofCommerce, 509 F.2d
1009 (9th Cir. 1975).
105. In re Hammons, 438 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Miss. 1977); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v.
Wolfe City Nat'l Bank, 544 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). By analogy, one need take no action

NORTH DAkOTA LAW REVIEW

perfection of pre-change security interests. "A debtor cannot
destroy the perfected security interest of a secured party by merely
changing its name or corporate structure, particularly when there is
no evidence to indicate that the secured party had no knowledge
thereof.",' 06 If, however, the secured party knew that a change was
imminent, the result could be otherwise.' 0 7 Even under the older
statute, there are some problems. After characterizing a "spin off"
of assets as a mere change of name for UCC purposes, the Sixth
Circuit intimated that a radical change of name might require
refiling. 108
Whether under the revised or original statute, it is sound
practice for lender's counsel to check the debtor's corporate history
for name changes prior to making any search for financing
statements. Many careful practitioners under the older version use
the ubiquitous UCC-3 form, which covers amendments, partial
releases, continuations, etc., to indicate the name change on the
record. In this new filing, the new corporate name is listed as
debtor, and language included in the body of the form to indicate
the reason for the amendment. Assuming that the secured party
learns of the name change, the amendment would appear to be a
reasonable precaution. 0 9 Under the revision, however, an
"appropriate" refiling may require a new financing statement,
which could arguably create difficulties if there are intervening
creditors under either name, or bankruptcy shortly follows the
refiling.
If a debtor merges into a new entity a related question arises:
How effective is a premerger security interest in inventory or
accounts receivable against inventory acquired and accounts
arising after the merger? In one case involving this point, the court
drew together the old security agreement, the debt-assumption
provisions of the merger documents, and the secured party's assent
to the merger to find a security agreement binding on the new
entity." 10 Fortunately, the surviving corporation had the same
(tnder the older version of the statute) when a woman debtor marries and adopts her husband's
name. In re Cac, II U.C.C. Rep. 412 (W.D. Mich. 1972).
106. Inter Moitstain Ass'n ofCredit Men v. Villager, Inc., 527 P.2d 664, 671 (Utah 1974); In re
Sofa Centre, Inc., 18 U.C.C. Rep. 536 (M.D. Fla. 1975); In re Smith-Whitehead, Inc., 17 U.C.C.
Rep. 589 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
107. In re Kalamazoo Steel Process, Inc., 503 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1974); In re Conger Printing
Co., 18 U.C.C. Rep. 224(D. Ore. 1975).
108. In re Kittyhawk Television Corp.. 516 F.2d 24, 28-29 (6th Cir. 1975).
109. It has been ruled that the debtor mast sign an amendment. [19771 TENN. ATT'Y GFN. OP
No. 4.
1 10. Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Salerno, 168 Conn. 152, 362 A.2d 904 (1975). See text at note
39 supra re the "bndle of papers" problem in general.
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name as the original debtor, and the further problems of a name
change did not arise.'''
DEBTOR'S ADDRESS
A financing statement must contain "a mailing address of the
debtor." 1 12 An actual residence address is not necessary so long as a
.satisfactory mailing address is given.' 1 3 It need not be where the
collateral is kept." 4 It has been held that a former address of the
debtor was sufficient since he had moved only six months prior to
the filing of the financing statement, and presumably mail would be
forwarded." 5 In some cases, a partial address has been held
sufficient on a financing statement. 1 6 But what if no address at all
is given? The logical answer is that the 8filing is defective," 7 but
there are a few decisions to the contrary."
SECURED PARTY'S NAME
Using the name of a parent sales company instead of the sales
financing subsidiary has been upheld, 1 9 as has the use of the name
of a division. 120 Where the secured party was later merged into
another corporation, but remained as a division of the surviving
entity, attack on the sufficiency of the financing statement,
claiming a misnomer, was rejected.12' Where the loan was in the
Fliegel v. Associates Capital Co., 537 P.2d 1144 (Ore. 1975).
111. Seer
112. U.C.C.. 9-402(1). In Califbrnia, therc is an additional rettirement to sippl'. "if the
debtor is an indix idoal, the address of his residence and the address of his chief place oflbusiness, if
an\.'" Cm.. Cost. CoibF. § 9402(l) (West 1964). Absence of the actual address has been held a minor
error, l incs v. Bank of California, 467 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1972).
113. In reDe-Fc'ctronics, Inc. 4 U.C.C. Rep. 450 (D. Conn. 1967): In reSearles. 9 U.C.C.
Rep. 538 (D. Me. 1971): In r Sniih. 10 U.C.C. Rep. 730 (W.D. Okla. 1971).
114. In reTheGrape Arbor. Inc., 6 U.C.C. Rep. 632 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
115. In rcMcCoy, 330 F.Supp. 533 (D. Kan. 1971): In reSimpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. 250 (W.D.
Mich. 1966).
116. In reBankript Estate of Smith, 508 F.2d 1323 (5th Cir. 1975): Architectural Cabinet, Inc.
N.Manl'y. 3 U.C.C. Rep. 263 (Pa. Counts Ct. 1966). An incorrect. but reasonably close, spelling
of the town name has been held not seriosly misl'ading. In reRavmond F. Sargent, Inc., 8 U.C.C.
Rep. 583 (D. Me. 1970).
117. In reSmith, 205 F.Sttpp. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1962): In reLindley, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 757 (N.D. Ala.
1973) and cases cited: In rc HGS Technical Associates, Inc., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 237 (E.D. Tenn.
1972), id.at 247 (F.D. Tenn. 1973): In reChildress, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 549 (E.D. Tenn. 1969) (dictum)
Birlington Nat'l Bank v. Straiss, 50 Wis. 2d 170, 184 NW.2d 122 (1971).
118. Rooney v. Mason, 394 F.2d 250, (10th Cir. 1968) (addresses were "readily available and
known by virtually all of the crditors'): Matter of Fowler, 407 F. Stpp. 799 (W.D+ Okla. 1975): In
re French, 317 F.Sopp. 1226 (E.D.Tenn. 1970). Rile's. Miller, 549 S.W.2d 314 (Ky.App. 1977).
119. In reColorado Mercantile Co., 299 F. Supp. 55 (D. Colo. 1969). Seealso Roberts v. Int'l
Harvester Credit Corp., 143 Ga.App. 206, 237 S.E.2d 697 (1977). Problems may arise where there
is a claimed assignment from the named sectired party to a related entity. Sec Thorp Sales Corp. v.
Okla. 1978).
Dolese Bros. Co., 453 F. Stpp. 196 (W.D.
120. Clarke Floor Mach. Div. v.Gordon, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 363 (Md. 1970); In reMurphy Inns.
Inc., 10 C.B.C. 787, 806 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
121. In reWilco Forest Mach., Inc., 491 F.2d 1041, 1045 (5th Cir. 1974).
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familiar SBA-bank participation format, naming the servicing
bank as secured party has been held sufficient to perfect the
interests of both the servicing bank and the SBA. 2
Use of a nominee's name as the secured party of record
appears to be permissible. 123 The adverse decision of one
bankruptcy judge who held that "lack of perfection would seem to
follow as a matter of course where the identity of the real secured
party is concealed by using an entirely different name as the
secured party of record for the purpose of deliberately misleading
25
third persons' 1' 24 was reversed on appeal. 1
In re E. A. Fretz Co. 126 involved what the Fifth Circuit
described as "floating secured parties." The security agreement
and financing statement named the secured party as "Revlon,
Inc." However, the obligation portion of the security agreement
recited that it secured
•. all debts. . . owing by Debtor. . . to REVLON,
INC. and/or all of its present and future divisions and
affiliates. . . including without limitation any debt,
liability or obligation owing from Debtor. . . to others
which REVLON, INC. . . . may have obtained by
27
assignment or otherwise. 1
At the time of bankruptcy, about $30,000 was due to Revlon itself,
but debtor owed two Revlon affiliates almost $200,000. After
bankruptcy, these latter claims were assigned to Revlon, Inc.
Under the caption "Floating Secured Parties Are All Wet" the
court held that only the debt due to Revlon itself was secured,
stating:
Surely floating debt and floating collateral provide
all the uncertainty any creditor should be required to
suffer. When floating secured parties are wading in the
122. In re Fried Frniture Corp., 293 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), qff'd, 407 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.
1969): R usso v. First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co., 21 U.C.C. Rep. 648 (E.D. Pa. 1976), and
cases cited. "When the hoklers of obligations issued under an indenture of trust, equipment trust
agreement or the like are represented by a trustee or other person, the representative is the secured
party.' U.C.C. § 9-105(i)(i), 1972 U.C.C. § 9-105(i)(m). Questions regarding the nature of the
relationship between a lead lender and participants are beyond the scope of this text.
123. Indstrial Packing Prod. Co. v. Fort Pitt Packaging Int.,Inc., 399 Pa. 643, 161 A.2d 19
(1960).
124. In reCuishman Baker,, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 267, 278 (D. Me. 1974).
125. In re Cuishman Bakery, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 897 (D. Me.), af'd, 526 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 937 (1976).
126. 565 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1978).
127. In re E. A. Fretz Co., Inc., 565 F.2d 366, 368 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978).
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wings, clairvoyance, not mere knowledge, would be
essential. We are unwilling to impose on any junior
secured creditor, with knowledge or without, the
additional risk that, at a date subsequent to his perfection,
any affiliate of the senior creditor or any stranger to it unnamed as secured parties in a security agreement or a
financing statement - could be metamorphosed into
senior secured parties by virtue of an assignment 'or
otherwise,' pre-or post-bankruptcy. .

.

. No reasonable

bank would ever make a loan in the wake of so much
floating. Fear of floundering on the rocks would be far too
great. 128
It is suggested that this court goes a bit far in its description of the
watery grave awaiting those who are junior to an open-ended
financing arrangement. At least as to affiliates, the Revlon
agreement does little more than provide for a line of credit, which
may be extended by itself or by a related entity.
SECURED PARTY'S ADDRESS
The financing statement must contain "an address of the
secured party from which information concerning the security
9
interest may be obtained."12 This requirement has been treated in

a relatively relaxed fashion. Where the security agreement was
itself filed as a financing statement, the address, appearing in the
body of the agreement, was held sufficient. 13 0 It has been held that
if the street address is omitted, the address may be sufficient if
reference to the local telephone directory will provide an
unmistakable street address. 131 Use of a post office box address has
been upheld.1 32 A complete lack of address should be fatal, 133 but
there is contrary authority. 134
128. Id. at 372.

129. U.'C. C. § 9 -402(1)
130. Goldie v. Bauchet Prop.. 15 Cal. 3d 307, 540 P.2d 1 (1975).
131. In re Bengtson, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 283 (D. Conn. 1965). But cf Mid-America Dairymen. Inc.
v. Newian Grove C.C. Co.. Inc., 191 Neb. 74. 214 NW.2d 18 (1974), where failre to inclde the
telephone directors in a stip olation of facts may ha\ e been fatal.
132. Silver v. GitlfCitv Body & Trailer Works, 432 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1970): Wall Invest. Co.
v. Garden State Dist. Ilo..

__

P.2d __

(Wash. 1979).

133. Strevell-Paterson Finance Co. v. May. 77 N.M. 331. 422 P.2d 366 (1967): In re Gibson's
Disco.nIt Pharmacy, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 233 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
134. See cases cited at note 118 supra.
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COLLATERAL DESCRIPTION -

IN GENERAL

135

The rights of the parties to a security agreement and the place
of filing the agreement or a financing statement, 1 36 often depend
upon the classification of the collateral under the Code. In view of
the problems which have arisen in the cases and in practice, a brief
review of Code criteria may be useful.
The Code classifications are primarily functional in nature, at
least regarding the subclassifications of "goods," and are based
upon the type of property, or its use in the hands of the owner.
Goods includes all movables and fixtures (determined at the
time the security interest attaches), but not including money,
documents, instruments, accounts, chattel paper, and general
intangibles. 137 The older Article 9 also excludes "contract rights
and other things in action,' 1 38 both terms being dropped as
unnecessary from the 1972 version. 139 The 1972 version contains
the additional exclusion of "minerals or the like (including oil and
gas) before extraction.' 140 Both versions include as goods the kinborn young of animals and growing crops, the 1972 Code
additionally including "standing timber which is to be crit and
removed under the conveyance or contract for sale,'" 14' a provision
which has caused some consternation in jurisdictions where the title
insured timber deed is the standard method of conveying incut
timber.
Goods are divided into four classes: consumer goods, farm
products, inventory, and equipment.
(1) Consumer goods are those used or bought primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes. 142 The test of primary use
is extremely important in making this classification. For example:
Debtor purchases a "Home-Tone Chord Organ" from Seller.
Seller takes a security interest in the organ for the unpaid portion of
the purchase price but does not file, knowing that filing is not
required for a purchase money security interest in consumer
goods.'4 3 Actually, however, Debtor is a night club entertainer
(part-time) and uses the organ primarily in his work. The organ is
135. This d iscission is d rawn in par( from HilIman, The U. C.C.
R. I. BAR ANNCA,1. 1 (1967), reprinted I U.C.C.I..J. 220(1969).
136. U.C.C. 5 9-401.
137. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(f); 1972 U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(h).

curity
Agreement. An A nalvi , 4

138. U.C.C. § 9-1050 ( )

139. 1972 U.C.C. § 9-105, Reasons for Change.

140. 1972 U.C.C. § 9-105( )(b).

141. Id
142. U.C.C. § 9-09(1). T
143. U.CC. § 9-302(1)(d). There are local variations of this themne.
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equipment, not consumer goods, and Seller's interest is
unperfected. 1 4 4 (2) Farmproducts includes the following if they are in
the possession of a debtor engaged in farming: crops, livestock,
supplies used or produced in farming operations, unmanufactured
products of crops or livestock and oysters on leased, licensed, or
owned beds. 145 (3) Inventory consists of goods held for sale, lease, to
be supplied under a service contract or raw materials in process or
consumed in the business. 146 (4) Equipment is bought and used
primarily in business, farming, or a profession, or by a non-profit
organization or governmental agency. 147 Anything not included in
the three prior definitions is also considered equipment. 148
The distinctions between these classes are indicated by the
49
following examples: 1
A. Dealer A sells a car (inventory in A's hands) to B City, for
use as a police cruiser (equipment). Later B sells the car to C, an
individual, for family use (consumer goods). The car falls into
disrepair and C sells to D, a junk dealer (inventory).
B. A, a farmer, has some eggs laid by his hens (farm
products). He sells some to B, a restaurant (inventory), some to C,
a supermarket (inventory), and the balance to D, a housewife
(consumer goods).
C. A owns an antique auto which he drives for pleasure
(consumer goods). He sells it to B, a bank, for use as a window
display (equipment). B later resells to C, a dealer in antique cars
(inventory). 150
D. A, a doctor, purchases a car, used both for his many house
calls and extensively by Dr. A, his wife and family, for their
personal travel. There is no clear answer here. 15' The controlling
test of primary use cannot give a ready answer. The practical
solution is to do whatever is necessary for perfection under all
probable classifications.
The non-tangible classes of collateral are also defined in the
Code. 152 The importance of understanding this collateral
144. Strevell- Paterson Finance Co. v. May, 77 N.M. 331,422 P.2d 366 (1967).
145. U.C.C. § 9-109(3).

146. U.C.C. § 9-109(4).

147. Firniture, furnishings. and rtigs sold to a non-profit corporation are eqiuipmnlc.
United
States v. Baptist Golden Age Home, 226 F.Supp. 892 (VV.D. Ark. 1964).
148. U.C.C. § 9-109(2).
149. The automotive examples, ofcourse, assume an absence ofeertificate oftitle reqttirements.
150. In re Shepler, 54 Berks L.J. 110 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v.
Warren Lepley Ford, Inc., 12 Pa.D. &C.2d 351 (1957).
151. See Hogan, Financing the Acquisition of New Goods Under the U. C, C., 3 BOsTON CoL. L. RFv.
115, 120 (1962). See ,enerallv Funk. Problems of Classtfication Under Article 9. 102 PA. L. Rrvs. 703
(1954).
152. These non-tangible classes of collateral are defined in the U.C.C. at these sections: chattel
paper: U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b); docutments: U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(e); 1972 U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(1):
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classification scheme is illustrated by some recent cases. Where the
secured party had a valid security interest in debtor's inventory, it
nevertheless was prohibited from selling the repossessed goods,
since it was not a secured party to the essential general intangibles
of patent rights and licenses, 153 the security agreement failing to
specifically list these items. A bank claimed relocation payments
which a local redevelopment agency owed its debtor, claiming that
the bank had an absolute right over the account by an assignment.
15 4
The claim was denied, as the payments were general intangibles,
and filing was required in order to perfect the bank's security
interest.
DESCRIPTION
155
AGREEMENT

OF

COLLATERAL

-

SECURITY

The security agreement, as opposed to the financing
statement, 156 must contain as precise a schedule of collateral as
possible. 157 As one bankruptcy judge stated, "while 'goods, wares,
and merchandise' might suffice as a description. . . of the types of
collateral. . . those words are insufficient for the purposes of
[Section 9-110] which requires a reasonable identification of the
property described [in the security agreement]. "158
Accounts receivable and inventory (despite the last quotation)
are not conducive to extremely detailed descriptions, and one
would hope that courts will accept the principle that "a description
of personal property should be liberally construed where the articles
are numerous and are of relatively small value on a unit basis."1 5 9
However, equipment presently owned can be listed with some
particularity, and it is better practice so to do, as is well illustrated
by the case of In re Laminated Veneers, Inc. 160
instruments: U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(g); 1972 U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(i); acconts: U.C.C. 5 9-106; general
intangibles: 1972 U.C.C. § 9-106. "Contract Right," used only in the earlier Article 9, is defined in
U.C.C. 59-106.
153. In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 23 U.C.C. Rep. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
154. In rejoseph Kanner Hat Co., Inc., 482 F.2d 937, 939 (2d Cir. 1973); Kapp v. United
States. 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1355 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
155. U.C.C. § 9-203(l )(b). This section requires that a description of land be included when a
security interest covers crops or timber. North Dakota has added oil, gas, or minerals to the list of
collateral reqiiring a land description. N.D. CENT. COoE § 41-09-16(l)(b) (1967).
156. In re Fairway Wholesale, Inc., 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1429 (D. Conn. 1977); American
Restaurant Supply Co. v. Wilson, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 1159 (Fla. App. 1979); In re Nyack Rug &
Furniture Co.. Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1405 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
157. In re E.P.G. Computer Services, Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Contra, In re
Whitacre. 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1169 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
158. In re Fairway Wholesale, Inc., 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1429, 1435 (D. Conn. 1977). Contra, In re
Parsons College, No. 24-73 (S.D. Iowa, April 16, 1974) ("all personal property" upheld).
159. GAC Credit Corp. v. Small Btusiness Administration, 323 F.Suipp. 795, 798 (W.D. Mo.
1971).
160. 471 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1973).
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In that case, the security agreement contained a twenty-two
page schedule of items and ended with a catch-all clause:
In addition to all the above enumerated items, it is the
intention that this mortgage shall cover all chattels,
machinery, equipment, tables, chairs [etc., etc.] and all
other items of equipment and fixtures belonging to the
mortgagor, whether herein enumerated or not, now at the
plant of [debtor], and all chattels, machinery, fixtures, or
equipment that may hereafter be brought in or installed
in said premises or any new premises of [debtor] to
replace, substitute for, or in addition to the above
described chattels and equipment.... 161
The list of collateral included a truck, but did not specifically
describe two automobiles which were owned by the debtor. It was
agreed that the autos were "equipment" under the Code. The
Second Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, upheld the ruling of the
bankruptcy Judge 62 that the automobiles were not covered by the
security agreement.
The type of problems raised by Laminated Veneers can be
illustrated by In re Sarex Corporation163 another Second Circuit case.
In Sarex, the security agreement described the collateral as
"machinery,
equipment and fixtures; molds, tools, dies,
' 64
including specifically [4 molds described].'
parts
component
The trustee argued that only the four specifically described molds
were covered, relying upon Laminated Veneers. The court disagreed,
distinguishing its decision in the earlier case by stating as follows:
Laminated Veneers does not stand for the proposition
that the use of generic terms in a security agreement will
be given no effect. It does stand for the proposition that
the generic term 'equipment' used in reference to a
lumber business does not include within it two
automobiles, at least where a truck is specifically itemized
in the schedule. ...
. . . Laminated Veneers tells us that reliance purely on
generic terminology may... be insufficient. This case lies
161.
162.
163.
164.

In reLaminated Veneers Co.. Inc., 471 F.2d 1124. 1125 n.I (2d Cir. 1973).
In re Laminated Veneers, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. 602 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
509 F.2d689(2dCir. 1975).
In re Sarex Corporation 509 F.2d 689, 690 (2d Cir. 1975).
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in between and. . . we hold the language in question to
have reasonably specified
and therefore identified the
65
collateral in question.
The Second Circuit seems to be applying ejusdemgeneris principles to
security agreement descriptions. In any event, to avoid prolonged
litigation over whether a description more nearly resembles
Laminated Veneers than Sarex, the description should specifically
include at least all major items of collateral.
In one case, 166 the collateral description read "all equipment
as detailed in Exhibit A attached." There was no exhibit attached.
The bankruptcy judge, in an extremely liberal ruling, held the
single word "equipment" sufficient as a description. 167 In another,
the Code generic "inventory" was held insufficient where the
68
collateral was not all of the debtor's stock in trade. 1
DESCRIPTION
STATEMENT

OF

COLLATERAL

-

FINANCING

The financing statement must contain "a statement indicating
the types, or describing the items of collateral.'" : 69 As one state
court has noted:
The description of collateral in a financing statement
need not be specific or exact as long as it reasonably
identifies the type of property in which a security interest
has attached. . . . It is sufficient if it provides enough
information to put a person on notice of the existence of a
security interest in a particular type of property so that
further inquiry can be made about the property subject to
the security interest. 170
Indeed, it has been said that "[o]nly the most basic description of
property deemed to be collateral... was contemplated....
The facts in reported cases have ranged from a complete
failure to list any collateral to a precise serial number identification.
165. Id. at 691-92.
166. In reWhitacre, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1169 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
167. To the same effect, Drysdale v. Cornerstone Bank, 562 S.W.2d 182 (Mo. App. 1978).
168. In re Fairway Wholesale, Inc., 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1429 (D. Conn. 1977). See also American
Restaurant Supply Co. v. Wilson, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 1159 (Fla. App. 1979). See text at note 172 infra
regarding lost exhibits to financing statements.
169. U.C.C. § 9-402(l).
170. Heights v. Citizens National Bank, 463 Pa. 48, 342 A.2d 738. 743 (1975).
171. Bit. ins v. Southwest Bank, 490 F.2d 1304, 1307 (9th Cir. 1974).
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In several instances, the financing statement collateral description
or similar
was a reference over, "see attached schedules,"
language. Although the secured parties contended that the
attachment had been lost after presentation to the filing officer, they
were unsuccessful. 17 2 These cases represent a regularly recurring
problem. It is suggested that attachments to the financing statement be avoided, and, if unavoidable, that the reference over be a
description in itself, e.g., "Equipment [or whatever], now owned or
hereafter acquired, as more particularly described in the attached

schedule.

'173

In general, statements filed in commercial transactions have
permitted broad language, 1714 including use of Code generic
descriptions. Filings have been upheld where the stated collateral

' 7
was "inventory, ''175 "motor vehicles,' 'i76 "equipment,' 1
1
78
1
"accounts receivable,''
"livestock,'' 79 and "furniture, fur-

nishings and equipment." 8 0 However, if one intends to reply upon
UCC generic classifications, he must be quite sure that the
description used correctly reflects the nature of the collateral in the
172..J.K. Gill Co. v. Firestone Realty, Inc., 262 Ore. 486, 499 P.2d 813 (1972); Rosch Factors,
Inc., v. Passport Fashion, Inc., 67 N.Y.Misc. 2d 3,322 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sop. Ct. 1971); In re Antekcier. 6 U.C.C. Rep. 1027 (W.D. Mich. 1969). Contra, with additional facts, In re Bowser, I U.C.C.
Rep. 626 (W .D. Pa. 1961).
173. In reStegman, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 225 (S.D. Fla. 1974). Seealso In reVaillancoirt, 7 U.C.C.
Rep. 748 (D. Me. 1970). Butc .J.K.Gill Co. v. Firestone Realty, Inc., 262 Ore. 486, 499 P.2d 813
(1972) (sotficiencs of secority agreement description).
174. See, eg.,Stephens v. Bank of Camilla. 133 Ga. App. 210. 210 S.E.2d 358 (1974) (-3 leases
ofequpipnrient").
175. In reNickerson & Nickerson. Inc.. 530 F.2d 811, 329 F. Supp. 93 (D. Neb.), aff'd, 452 F.2d
56 (8th Cir. 1971): Security Tire & Robber Co. v. Hlass, 246 Ark. 1084, 441 S.W.2d 91 (1969);
Evans Prods. Co. v.,Jorgensen, 245 Ore. 362, 421 P.2d 978 (1966); Thompson v.O.M. Scott Credit
Corp., 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 85(1962); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Wolfe City Nat. Bank, 544
S.W.2d 947 (Tex.Civ. App. 1976). Contra, In reModern Engineering & Tool Co., Inc., 25 U.C.C.
Rep. 580 (D. Conn. 1978): InreTerry. 10C.B.C. 289 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
176. James Talcott. Inc. v. Franklin Nat. Bank of Mpls.. 292 Minn. 277, 194 N.W.2d 775
(1972): General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Terra Contractors Corp.. 6 U.C.C. Rep. 544 (N.Y_
Cir. Ci. 1969): Bank of Utica v. Smith Richfield Springs, Inc., 58 N.Y.Misc. 2d 113,294 N.Y.S.2d
797 (1968): In reStephens, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 597 (W.D. Okla. 1970) ("passenger aotomobiles"):
Commtunity Bank %..Jones, 278 Ore. 647, 566 P.2d 470 (1977): Fedders Financial Corp. v. Chiarelli
Bros. . .'289 A.2d 169 (Pa. Sop. 1972) ("air conditioners"): In re Kane, I U.C.C. Rep. 582
(E.D.Pa. 1962).
177. Nlountain Credit v. Michiana Lumher & Supply. Inc.. 498 P.2d 967 (Colo. App. 1972):
Mary.land Nat'l Bank v. Porter-Way Harvester Mfg. Co.. 300 A.2d 8 (Del. Sop. 1972): In re
Bloomiingdale Milling Co.. 4 U.C.C. Rep. 256 (W.D.Mich. 1966): In re Whiteacre, 21 U.C.C.
Rep. 1169 (S.I.N.Y. 1976): Goodall Ribber Co. x. Mews Ready Mix Corp., 7 U.C.C. Rep. 1358
(Wis. Cir, C1. 1970): Security Barnk & Trust Co. v. Blaze Oil Co.. 463 P.2c1 495 (WVyo. 1970). Contra,
i reWerth. 23 U.C.C. Rep. 489 (D. Kan. 1977): I reTerry. 10 C.B.C+ 289 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
178. In u,Carmichael Ent., Inc., 334 F. Sopp. 94 (N.D.Ga. 1971). qff'd, 460 F.2d 1405 (5th
Cii. 1972): Ii re Varnev Wood Products. Inc.. 458 F.2d 435 (4th Cir. 1972): Barnett Bank
Fletcher. 290 So. 2d533 (Fla. App. 1974): In rcAiterican Plating & Mfg. Co.. 26 U.C.C+ Rep. 497
(W.).Kv. 1979): Walker Bank & Trust Co. . Snith, 501 P.2d 639 (Nev. 1972): In reBerger, 7
C.B.C. 703 (F.I). Va. 1976).
179. Peoples Bank v. Northwest Georgia BaRnk. 19 U.C.C. Rep. 953 (Ga. App. 1976). Bate'
Malzac. 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1223
lantd & Lives ock Co. v. Nixon. 560 P.2d 1334 (Mont. 1977): In i,,
(D. Vt. 1972): Barth Bros. v. Billings. 68 Wis .2d 80. 227 N.W.2d 763 (1975).
180. Yoitn v.Golden State Bank, 560 P.2d 855 (Colo. App. 1977).
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1 and that the financing
hands of the debtor, 18
statement description
is as broad as the security agreement. 8 2 While the primary
collateral may be "inventory," there may be plans, licenses, etc.,
necessary for manufacture, which are classified as "general
intangibles" or (under the pre-1972 text) as "contract rights. "1,1
One cannot be too general. Despite some favorable
decisions, 84 phrases such as "all personal property,''' 8 5 or "all
present and future assets'" 8 6 have often been held insuifficient to
encompass specific classes of assets: "fail] personal property" is too
broad to describe livestock and farm equipment, 8 7 and "other
physical assets" does not include inventory.' 8 8 A few other
examples may be useful: "[r]eplacement parts and accessories" has
been held insufficient to cover whatever of that nattre debtor
possessed.' 8 9 Where the collateral was a small Ford trick, the
description "1966 Ford" was held to satisfy the statte.' 90
"Supplies" does not cover equipment and machinery.' 9' Except in
Kentucky, 92 it appears that "all farm equipment" is a sufficiently
precise description of collateral for a financing statement. ,91
In consumer finance a more exacting standard may be applied.
While some decisions have upheld "consumer goods" as sLfficient
to cover "all tangible personal property owned by a debtor except
for that used in business or for farming,' ' 94 other coturts have
disagreed, finding a "commercial policy applicable to inventory

181. In re Charolais Breeding Ranches, L.td., 21 U .C..
Rcp. 193 (W.). Wis. 1976).
182. Gcorgia-Patific Corp v. ltm t'r Prod.(:o.,
590 P.2d 661 ()kla. 1979).
183. In re Emergency Bcattn Corp., 23 U.C.C. Rep. 766 (S.) .N.Y. 1977).
184. L.easing Service Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank, 19 U.C.f . Rep. 252 (I). N.. 1976). In rc
JCM Coop., Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. 247 (W.D. Mich. 1970).
185. In re L.ockwood, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 195, 203 D. Conn. (1974).
186. In re H.L. Bennctt Co., __
F.2d
- (3d Cir. 1976): Moguil Ent., In(. v. Ctmmetrcial
Crdit Bijsincss Loans, Inc., 25 U.CC. Rep. 293 (N.M. 1978); In rc E.p. . Cutipotr Servies. 20
U.C.C. Rep. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See alto Materrial Service Corp. v. Bogla;v(icz. 26 U.C.C.
Rep. 185 (ill. App. 1979) ("certain land trusts").
187. In re Foqoa, 461 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1972).
188. In re Kirk Kabinets, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 746 (M.D. Ga. 1974).
189. Howarth v. Universal CI.T. Credit Corp., 203 F. Stpp. 279 (W.D). Pa. 1962).
190. In re Esqujire Produce Co., 5 U.C.C. Rep. 257 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).SeeaLo Associates Capital
(orp. v. Bank of H,ntsville, 274 So. 2d 80 (Ala. App. 1973).
191. In re Vaillanco,,r, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 748 (D. Me. 1970).
192. Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. York, 429 S.W.2d 26 (Ky. 1968), but cf In re
Anselm, 344 F. Sjpp. 544 (D. Ky. 1972).
193. United States v. Crittenden, 563 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'd,
U.S. __
(1979);
United State's v. First Nat'l Bank, 470 F.2d 944 (8th Cir. 1973); First Nat'l Bank v. Calvin Pickle
Co., I1 U.C.C. Rep. 1245 (Okla. App. 1973).
194 In re Tornage, 493 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1974); In re Trimble, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 543 (W.D.
Mich. 1968): Inre.Johnson, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 953 (D. Neb. 1973).
[19681 Ky. ATT'Y GEN. Op. 68-167 held that the description "all household goods" was
satisfactory. 119711 S.C. ATT'Y GEN. Op. 3156 agreed, but held that the abbreviation "HHG" is
instfficient. See aLso In re Beneficial Finance Co. v. Van Shaw, 476 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Ci'. App.
1972): In re Thompson, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 1407 (W.D. Wisc. 1971). Counsel should also keep in mind
the ten-day limitation on after-acqired consimer goods. U.C.C. § 9-204(4)(b). See In re Harris, 23
U.C.C. Rep. 220 (N.D. Ga. 1977), and text at note 199 infra.
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. . which is not present in an individual loan case
The term has been held "too broad, general and
meaningless. ' 196 One case has even held that the description "1
refrigerator, White, Philco" was "obviously insufficient.'" 97 The
test in the consumer context, according to one court, is whether the
description is "specific enough to allow the creditor's agents or the
sheriff to distinguish between the goods subject to the security
interest and other consumer goods owned by the debtor which may
be similar in type but not subject to the security interest.'" 98 Note,
too, that for purposes of the Truth-in-Lending Act and Regulation
Z, any claim of an interest in after-acquired consumer goods must
state the ten-day limitation of UCC 9-204 (4) (b). 199
When a creditor goes to the opposite extreme, and gives a very
specific description of the collateral, a rule akin to expressio unius applies. He risks losing his security interest in related items not encompassed by the specifics. For example: Where the collateral was
described as "band transceivers," crystals, described as accessories
to transceivers, were held not to be included, 200 a decision which
will suprise anyone who tries to operate a crystal-controlled
transceiver without the crystal. "Cotton waste" does not cover'
''cotton linters" where the latter are distinguished in trade
usage, 20 1 and "dental equipment" does not cover the doctor's
office equipment and furnishings. 20 2 Similarly, "mechanical or
electrical commercial, household or industrial equipment" does
not encompass carpets and furniture held as inventory. 20 3 Counsel

financing.
",195

195. In re Lehner, 303 F. Supp. 317, 319 (D. Colo. 1969), aff'd427 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1970).
196. Id. at 320. See White v. Household Finance Corp., 302 N.E.2d 828 (Ind. App. 1973); In re
Woods, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 116 (D. Kan. 1971). Seealso In reBell, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 740 (D. Colo. 1969).
197. Freeman v. Decatur Loan & Finance Corp., 140 Ga. App. 682, 231 S.E.2d 409, 411
(1976).
198. Aronson Furniture Co. v. johnson, 47 Ill.
App. 3d 648, 365 N.E.2d 61,65 (1977). But cf
Personal Thrift Plan v. Georgia Power Co., 25 U.C.C. Rep. 310 (Ga. 1978), where an abbreviated
description was upheld because no filing was required.
199. Carr v. Blazer Financial Services, 598 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1979); Tinsman v. Moline
Beneficial Finance Co., 531 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1976): Ecenrode v. Household Finance Corp.,
422 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Del. 1976); Sneed v. Beneficial Finance Co., 410 F. Supp. 1135 (D.
Hawaii 1976); In re Dunne, 407 F. Supp. 308 (D.R.I. 1976); Irvin v. Public Finance Co., 340
So.2d 811 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976); Aronson Furniture Co. v. Johnson, 47 111. App. 3d 648, 365
N.E.2d 61 (1977); Empire Finance Co.v. Ewing, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 539 (Ky. App. 1977); Conrad v.
Beneficial Finance Co., 398 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Lowery v. Finance America Corp., 32
N.C. App. 174, 231 S.E.2d 904 (1977). Contra, Anthony v. Commumity Loan & Inv. Corp., 559
F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1977); Public Loan Co. v. Hyde, 390 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sip. Ct. 1977). Good faith
reliance upon a Federal Reserve Board pamphlet is not a defense. Jacklitch v. Redstone Federal Credit Union, 463 F. Supp. 1134 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
200. In reRichards, I U.C.C. Rep. 620 (D. Conn. 1963).
201. Anawan Mills, Inc. v. Northeastern Fibers, Inc., 4 U.C.C. Rep. 787 (Mass. App. 1963).
As to reliance upon trade utsuage in analyzing the sufficiency ofa description, seeRay v. City Bank &
Trust, 358 F. Stipp. 630 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Raney v. Uvalde Producers Wool & Mohair, Inc., 571
S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
202. In reBerger, 7 C.B.C. 703 (E.D. Va. 1976).
203. In reNyack Rug& Furniture Co., 21 U.C.C. Rep. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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for creditors doing business in Kentucky should be aware that the
law of that state requires a financing statement to include the make,
year, model, and motor or identification number of a consumer
vehicle.

2°4

Errors in the description are often salvageable if they are
minor and not seriously misleading. 20 5 Thus, errors in serial
numbers are generally not fatal, 20 6 except, perhaps, where a
number of like items are involved and the absence of correct
numbers prevents identification. 20 7 However, a 1969 Toyota is
seriously misdescribed when called a 1969 Fiat, 20 8 and a "bridal
set" cannot be adequately described as a "bracelet set.'' 20 9 Giving
serial numbers without anything to identify the nature of the
collateral to which the numbers apply has been upheld,2 10 but is
clearly a dangerous practice.
It had appeared to be settled that after-acquired property of
the same variety as that described by a "type" description, e.g.,
"accounts receivable," "equipment," or "inventory," will be
covered by that description, and absence of the phrase "now or
hereafter acquired" in the financing statement would not be a
cause of trouble. 2 11 But the Third Circuit has reopened the question
and held to the contrary 2 12 the court requiring that the inclusion of
after-acquired property be unambiguously expressed in order to
201. Ky, RFv. STt. § 355.9-402(2) (1970). See In re Tomlin, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 197 (E.D. Ky.
1963).
205 U.C.C. 9-402(5); 1972 U.C.C. 5 9-402(8).
206. In re Vintage Press, Inc. 552 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1977) (secturity agreement); In re Delta
Molded Prods., Inc., 416 F.Supp. 938 (N.D. Ala. 1976); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Warthen Service
Co., 535 P.2d 162 (Nev. 1975); Samel Breiter & Co. v. Domler Leasing Corp., 19 U.C.C. Rep.
1248 (N.Y. Stip. Ct 1976); Appleway Leasing, Inc. v. Wilken, 39 Ore. App. 43 (1979); Nat'l Dime
Bank v. Cleveland Bros. Equip. Co., 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 511 (1959); McGehee v. Exchange Bank &
Trust, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 816 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Adams v. Nuffer, 550 P.2d 181 (Utah 1976); In
re Reiser. 20 U.C.C. Rep. 529 (W.D. Wis. 1976). Contra, Still Assoc. v. Murphy, 267 N.E.2d 217
(Mass. App. 1970).
207. United States v. Mid-States Sales Co., 336 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Neh. 1971): In re Aragon
Ind., Inc., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1218 (S.D. Fla. 1973). Butcf. In re Delta Molded Products, Inc., 416 F.
Supp. 938 (N.D. Ala. 1976), and Peoples Bank v. Northwest Georgia Bank, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 953
(Ga. App. 1976).
208. In re Hodgin, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 612 (W.D. Okla. 1970).
209. DWG, Inc. v. Peltier, 563 P.2d 152 (Okla. 1977).
210. In re Richards, 455 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1972). In re Bengtson, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 283, (D.
Conn. 1965); Personal Thrift Plan v. Georgia Power Co., 25 U.C.C. Rep. 310 (Ga. 1978) (security
agreement); In reA & T Kwik-N-Handi, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 765 (M.D. Ga. 1973).
211. In re Fibre Glass Boat Corp., 324 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D. Fla. 1971), afft'd, 448 F.2d 781 (5th
Cir. 1971); In re Nickerson & Nickerson, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 93 (D. Neb. 1971), afft'd, 452 F.2d 56
(8th Cir. 1971): In re Page. 16 U.C.C. Rep. 501 (M.D. Fla. 1974): Nat'l Cash Register Co. v.
Firestone & Co., 346 Mass. 255, 191 N.E.2d 471 (1963): In reTaylored Prods., Inc., 5 U.C.C. Rep.
286 (W.D. Mich. 1968); O'Hara & Shaver. Inc. v. Empire Bituminous Prods., Inc., 67 N.Y. Misc.
2d 47. 323 N.Y.S.2d 190 (County. Ct. 1971): American Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 473
P.2d 234 (Okla. 1970); South Cotnty Sand & Gravel Co. v. Bituminons Pavers Co., 106 R.I. 178,
256 A.2d 514 (1969); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Wolfe City Nat'l Bank, 544 S.W.2d 947
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
212. In re Middle Atlantic Stud Welding Co., 503 F.2d 1133 (3d Cir. 1974). See text at note 52
supra.
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promote "simpler, clearer and more certain law for all parties, 2 13
without significantly burdening the secured party. This more
conservative and verbose approach taken by the Third Circuit
would appear to be the better course.
It is not uncommon in inventory financing to describe the
collateral as located at a specific address. What if the debtor
changes the location of the collateral, or acquires additional
locations? Section 9-401(3) provides that the filing remains effective
"even though the debtor's residence or place of business . . . is
thereafter changed.''214 However, several bankruptcy trustees have

challenged security interests in those situations where the security
agreement specified a former address. They have been largely
unsuccessful to date, 2 5 but it is better practice to word the
collateral descriptions, in both the security agreement and the
financing statement, to include all inventory, "wherever located."
If the address given in the collateral description is not correct at the
time, it has been held that the description is insufficient to cover
collateral at another address.

21

6

CROPS OR FIXTURES AS COLLATERAL
When the collateral is crops, timber, minerals, or goods which
are or will become fixtures, a description of the real estate to which
they are related is required. 2

7

The Code considers a description of

real estate sufficient "whether or not specific if it reasonably
identifies what is described.'' 2 8 Thus, "the description need not
describe the property by a government survey, or by lots and
blocks, or metes and bounds, if it can be located from the
description given.'' 219 Failure to include a description of the real
22 0
estate is fatal.
It would .appear that a description by the name of the record
213. Id.
at 1136.
214. This applies. ofcotrse, only to a move within the same state.
215. In re Hammons. 438 F. Stupp+ 1143 (S.D. Miss. 1977): Owen v. McKesson & Robbins
Drug Co., 349 F. Stipp. 1327 (N.D. Fla. 1972), and cases cited: In re Little Brick Shirthoise. Inc.,
347 F.S,tp. 827 (N.D. Ill.. 1972). In re Page. 16 U.C.C. Rep. 501 (M.D. Fla. 1974). But (f Inter
Mmntain Ass'n of Credit Men v Villager. Inc., 527 P.2d 664 (Utah 1974).
216. In reCatifornia Prnp & Mfg. Co., 588 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1978).
217. U.C.C. § 9-402(1): In re Estate of Voelker, 252 N.W. 2d 400 (Iowa 1977).
218. U.C.C. § 9-110. However, care most be taken to insure that no greater specificity is
req ired by the local version of U.C.C. 5 9-402, or the applicable provisions of 1972 U.C.C.
9402(5). North Dakota is one ofthe states that requjires greater specificity for filing when the collateral
is fixtures or crops. N.D. CENT. CooF § 41-09-41 (1979).
219. [19721 11.1. ATT'V GEN. Op. 276. Se also Production Credit Ass'n v. Columus Mills. 22
U.C.C Rep. 228 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1977).
220. In re Mokint. 5 U.C.C. Rep. 653 (S.D. Ohio 1968): In re Shepard, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 249
(W.D. Va. 1974).
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owner 22 1 and a reasonable description (e.g., "the farm of Jones in
Central County near Smithville") will satisfy the statute, 222 but a
description by the name of the record owner alone will not. 223 The
"street number address" has also been held to be sufficient. 224
Revised Article 9's Section 9-402(6) contains a laudable
provision allowing a mortgage to be used as a financing statement
22 5
for fixture filings.
SIGNATURES
The earlier version of the code states that the financing
statement must be "signed by the debtor and the secured
party." 22 6 The 1972 version only requires that the debtor Sign the
financing statement. 227 "Signed," says the Code, "includes any
symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to
authenticate a writing." ' 228 The Official Comments to the latter
section indicate that a liberal reading is intended:
The inclusion of authentication in the definition of
'signed' is to make clear that as the term is used in this
Act a complete signature is not necessary. Authentication
may be printed, stamped or written; it may be by initials
or by thumbprint. It may be on any part of the document
and in appropriate cases may be found in a billhead or
letterhead. No catalog of possible authentications can be
complete and the court must use common sense and
commercial experience in passing upon these matters.
The question always is whether the symbol was executed
221. The 1972 Code § 9-402(5) reqoires that the financing statement include the name of the
record owner if the debtor does not have an interest of record and the collateral is timber, minerals,accotnts, or fixtures. Under the earlier version of the Code, the name of the record owner was
required for filings where the collateral is crops or fixtures in Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia,
Hawaii, Kansas (if a numerical index is not kept by the filing officer), Maine, Massachuisetts,
Minnesota, Mississippi (fixtuires), Missotri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New,Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
222. United States v. Big Z Warehotse, 311 F. Sipp. 283 (S.D. Ga. 1970); United States v.
Smith, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 502 (N.D. Miss. 1977); In re Colbert, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 511 (N.D. Miss.
1977); Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Oldham, 569 S.W.2d 833 (Tenn. Civ. App. 1977);
Ky. ATT'Y GEN. Op. 60-695. But cf People's Bank v. Pioneer Food Inds. Inc., 253 Ark. 277, 486
S.W.2d 24 (1972) 119601, Chanute Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Weir Grain & Supply, Inc., 210 Kan. 181,
499 P.2d 517 (1972).
223. Piggott State Bank v. Pollard Gin Co., 243 Ark. 159, 419 S.W.2d 120 (1967); First Nat'l
Bank v. Calvin Pickle Co., II U.C.C. Rep. 1245 (Okla. App. 1973).
224. Home Savings Ass'n v. Southern Union Gas Co., 486 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
225. U.C.C. 5 9-402(6).
226. U.C.C. 5 9-402(1). InreCarter, 25 U.C.C. Rep. 1162 (D. Me. 1978).
227. 1972 U.C.C. §9-402(1).
228. U.C.C. § 1-201(39).
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or adopted by the party with present intention to
229
authenticate the writing.
The courts, and state attorneys generally, have taken a great
20
variety of approaches in their interpretation of this requirement.
At one extreme, we find a few courts holding, under the earlier
Article 9 text, that the signature of the secured party is not
necessary. 2 1 On the other hand it has been held that if there are
two secured parties, the signatures of both are essential. 232 There
are also cases holding that the signature of a single partner in a
233
partnership debtor satisfies the requirement.
Imperfect or non-traditional "signing" has presented many
problems. Where the debtor was a corporation, and the signature
affixed was that of an individual without indication of his corporate
capacity, the filing has been held invalid by one court 234 but upheld
by others. 23 A security agreement signed by an individual on the
"by" line, followed by his corporate titles, has been upheld where
2 36
the corporate name appeared at the head of the document.
Where it is the signature of the secured party by an individual
whose corporate capacity is not noted, the signing has been held to
be valid, 2 37 at least where there is parole evidence of the
individual's authority to sign for that party. 238 A wife cannot sign
as agent for her spouse, since the marital relationship does not
239
establish agency.
In one case the secured party claimed that his signature
consisted of his initials on the attached inventory sheets. The
bankruptcy judge disagreed, indicating that he considered the
Official Comments to be too broad. 240 Where four retail
229. U.C.C. § 1201(39)Official Comment 39.
230. See Evans v. Moore. 14 U.C.C. Rep. 555 (Ga. App. 1974), involving this question under
the UCC sales article.
23 1. Riley v. Miller, 549 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. App. 1977); Strevell-Paterson Finance Co. v. May,
77 N.M. 331, 422 P.2d 366 (1967). Contra, Burlington Nat'l Bank v. Stratss, 50 Wis. 2d 170, 184
N.W. 2d1 122(1971).
232. In re Mrray, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 667 (D. Ore. 1964).
233. In r" Hartmons. 438 F. Stpp. 1143 (S.D. Miss. 1977), and cases cited.
234. In re PennarPaperCo.. 2 U.C.C. Rep. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
2:35. Peoples Bank v. Northwest Georgia Bank. 19 U.C.C. Rep. 953 (Ga. App. 1976); In reA &
T Kwik-N-Handi, Inc.. 12 U.C.C. Rep. 765 (M.D. Ga. 1973): Plemens v. Didde-Glaser, Inc., 244
Md. 566. 224 A.2d 464 (1966): Sherman v. Upton, 242 N.W.2d 666 (S.D. 1976), In re Reid
Communications, Inc., 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1436(W.D. Va. 1977).
236. In re,,A.G.G., Inc., 25 U.C.C. Rep. 1172 (D. Conn. 1979).
237. In re Sports Shack, Inc., 383 F. Stpp. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1974): In re Turcotte, 3 U.C.C. Rep.
774(1). Me. 196 6 ).
23 8. In re Williats. 16 U.C.C. Rep. 240 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
239. Sutliwest Bank v. Moritz. 203 Neb. 45, __
N.W.2d (1979): Provident Finance
Co. v. Beneficial Finance Co. 36 N.C. App. 401. 245 S.F.2d 510 (1978).
240. In re Phmmer. 6 U.C.C. Rep. 555 (E.D. Nlich. 1969). See Travelers Indeta. Co. v. First
Nat. Bank. :368 S.2d 836 (Miss. 1979): In re Indutstro Transistor Corp.. 14 U.C.C. Rep. 522
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
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installment sales contracts were filled out, with the balances on
three brought forward to the fourth, which was the only one signed,
it was held that the first three were invalid. 2 4' The Pennsylvania
attorney general has held that a hand printed signature will
242
suffice.
A number of cases have involved the following situation: The
standard UCC-1 financing statement has two lines for the signature
of the secured party. The upper is unlabeled; the lower begins with
the printed word "By." In each case the creditor's name was typed
on the first line and the second line was left blank.
In re Horvath, a case of first impression, the bankruptcy court
held in favor of the secured party, stating:
It is clear. . . that what constitutes a valid signing of a
financial [sic] statement is a very loose proposition. The
usual formality of corporate signing by an individual duly
authorized to act... who pens his signature in a corporate
capacity is not required. In the last analysis the question
is simply whether any symbol on the financing statement
was inserted or adopted by the secured party to
authenticate its participation in the security transaction
evidenced by the statement; to show that the statement
was genuine....
There was no direct evidence that [the secured party]
intended its typed name to constitute its authentication or
its evidencing of the genuineness of the statement. But,
from all that has been before the court on this matter, it is
clear that the bankrupt and [secured party] did enter into
a bona fide trust receipts financing arrangement; that the
bankrupt signed the financing statement which bears the
typed name of [the secured party] in the blank provided
for the signature of the secured party; that the financing
statement was filed. . . to give notice of the asserted
security interest ....
From all this common sense compels
the conclusion that the typed name. . . on the statement
could have been intended for no other purpose than to
reflect a showing. . . that the statement was genuine and
was to evidence a bona fide security interest obtained by
241. InreAtkins, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 315 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).
242. [19761 PA. ATTY' GEN. Op. 76-31.
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it. Thus, the typed name constituted a sufficient signing
2 43
to meet the loose, relaxed requirement of the Code.

A year later, the same bankruptcy judge faced the same problem
and reached the same result, in a decision that was subsequently
affirmed by the Second Circuit. 244 The following reflects his liberal
interpretation of Code requirements:
Medieval,
dogmatic insistence upon the precise
performance of all formalities, with disastrous results
attending the neglect of them, no longer holds dominant
sway in the law of secured transactions. Pragmatism and
realism have been brought to commercial law. It is a
welcomed relief to those concerned with and dependent
upon it.245
One of his colleagues examined similar facts and reached the
opposite conclusion: "In the instant case it is obvious that the bank
through oversight omitted signing this financing statement. In the
interest of preserving the integrity and reliability of the public
record it would seem preferable... to call an oversight an oversight
instead of a signature." , 246 The Maine Supreme Court has adopted

a strict approach to this issue and held a similar filing to be invalid.
The court disposed of Horvath summarily: "We are not disposed to
scuttle the Code requirements on a plea that they are loose and
relaxed. ''247
Quite often it will be necessary to file financing statements in
more than one filing office. In some states there is available a form
called UCC-2, which can be placed on top of a UCC-1 so that both
are prepared at once in the typewriter. Can both be signed at once,
so that one filing office will be given a set with carbon signatures?
Or can the original of one set be photocopied for the second filing?
We are faced with a broad range of opinions.
Judge Hiller held that "signed" means an "actual signature
243. In re Horvath, I U.C.C. Rep. 624 (D. Conn. 1963). See alsoMatter of Save-on-Carpets of
Arizona, Inc., 545 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1976).
244. In re Hargrove, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 40 (D. Conn. 1964), affd sub nom. Benedict v. Lebowitz,
346 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1965). See also Alloway v. Stwart, 385 S.W.2d 41 (Ky. 1964).
245. In reHargrove, 2 U.C.C. Rep. at 43-44.
246. In re Carlstrom, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 766, 773 (D. Me. 1966). Seealso In re Hogan, 20 U.C.C.
Rep, 1102 (D.S.C. 1976); In re Glass (N.D. Ala. 1975) as cited at 4 [19751 Se.c. TRANS. Gutmp 52 at
700 (CC H).
247. Maine League Federal Credit U. v. Atlantic Motors, 250 A.2d 497, 500 (Me. 1969). See
alsoLittle v. Cotnty of Orange, 31 N.C. App. 495, 229 S.E.2d 823 (1976), for the very strict North
Carolina r,de.
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manually produced by a writing instrument in the hand of the
signer in direct contact with the document being executed. , 248 The
attorney general of Kentucky agrees. 24 9 His counterpart in

Alabama considers a carbon signature to be satisfactory, but not a
photocopy unless "authenticated."

250

New Mexico assumes prima

facie validity of photo and carbon copies, 25' as do Ohio ,252
Wyoming,2 53 and perhaps Oklahoma. 25 4 Florida recognizes carbon
and

photocopied

signatures.

255

Carbon

signatures

256

satisfy

Maryland.
Missouri amended Section 9-402(1) by adding a final
sentence: "Without limiting the generality of the preceding
sentence, any financing or other statement.

.

.

which contains a

copy, however made, of the signature of a secured party or his
representative or of the debtor or his representative is 'signed'
''257

The practical decision here is simple. Unless one is operating
exclusively in Missouri, obtain sufficient originals signed for each
filing office. The revision of Article 9 has added a provision to
Section 9-402(1) which states: "A carbon, photographic or other
reproduction of a security agreement or a financing statement is
sufficient as a financing statement if the security agreement so
provides or if the original has been filed in this state."

258

Such a

provision in the security agreement should become boilerplate in
states which adopt the revisions.

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

In reKane, I U.C.C. Rep. 582, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
[19641 Ky.ATT'Y GEN. Op. 64-708.
[19671 ALA. ATT'Y GEN. OP.
[19621 N.M. ATT Y GEN. Op. 62-126.
[19621 OHIo ATT'Y GEN. Op. 3289.
[19621 Wyo. ATT'y GEN Op. 26.
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